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Abstract. A long history of longitudinal and intercultural research has
identified decommissioned storage devices (e.g., USB memory sticks) as
a serious privacy and security threat. Sensitive data deleted by previous
owners have repeatedly been found on second-hand USB sticks through
forensic analysis. Such data breaches are unlikely to occur when data
is securely erased, rather than being deleted. Yet, research shows people
confusing these two terms. In this paper, we report on an investigation of
possible causes for this confusion. We analysed the user interface of two
popular operating systems and found: (1) inconsistencies in the language
used around delete and erase functions, (2) insecure default options,
and (3) unclear or incomprehensible information around delete and erase
functions. We discuss how this could result in data controllers becoming
non-compliant with a legal obligation for erasure, putting data subjects
at risk of accidental data breaches from the decommissioning of storage
devices. Finally, we propose improvements to the design of relevant user
interface elements and the development of official guidelines for best
practice on GDPR compatible data erasure procedures.
Keywords: Privacy Evaluation · Data Erasure · GDPR · Cognitive
Walkthrough
1 Introduction
The right to erasure (or ‘right to be forgotten’) in Article 17 of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is considered by some to be the most difficult
obligation to comply with [3, p. 64]. It states that data subjects can, with certain
exceptions, have their personal data erased by the responsible data controller.
Moreover, it states that personal data should also be erased without undue delay
under other circumstances. For example, where the data is no longer required
for the purposes it was originally collected, or when the data subject withdraws
consent on which the processing was based. The UK’s national data protection
authority (ICO) states that data which is subject to a valid erasure request must
be placed “beyond use, even if it cannot be immediately overwritten” and can,
in certain circumstances, pose a significant data protection risk [5].
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The terms ‘delete’ and ‘erase’ are often used interchangeably. The Merriam
Webster thesaurus lists both words as related4, whilst the Oxford and Cambridge
dictionaries list them as synonyms5. Yet, in computer science these words have
a different meaning, and the distinction between the two has consequences for
compliance with data protection legislation.
From a technical perspective these terms describe different concepts. Erase
typically describes purposeful overwriting of data with other data – rendering it
immediately irretrievable – whilst delete typically refers to data being “forgot-
ten” by the operating system (OS) and being marked as available for overwrite.
This allows new data to be stored in its place when required, but is often re-
trievable until it has been overwritten.
It is perhaps unsurprising that confusion exists between these two terms due
to their linguistic similarity and interchangeable use in everyday conversation.
Yet, problems can emerge if a data controller is unaware of the technical dif-
ferences, with significant risks developing that could lead to exposure through
non-compliance with data protection legislation. For example, deleting rather
than erasing data from a decommissioned storage device could result in a data
breach. As most delete and erase operations are executed through a computer’s
OS, the user interface (UI) of these OS are well positioned to provide users with
guidance on the appropriate use of delete and erase operations to limit confusion
between these terms.
In this paper we report on an analytical investigation of potential conflicts
between UI file removal functions in macOS 10.14 and Windows 10, and legal
requirements for data erasure. We use accidental data breaches from decommis-
sioned USB sticks as the context for a streamlined Cognitive Walkthrough to
explore the gap between the legal data protection requirements for the erasure
of data, and file removal functions in two popular OS. In doing so, we discover
linguistic confusion within the UI of these OS, which could lead to increased un-
certainty when data controllers undertake their legal obligation to erase data. As
a result, our research identifies a need for guidelines and best practice on GDPR
compliant erasure. We present a set of implications for practice that could be
used to improve consistency between UIs and data protection legislation. Fi-
nally, our research evidences the importance of further investigations into the
suitability of those tools most commonly used by non-experts to comply with
regulatory requirements.
2 Background
In this section we first explore previous research into people’s data hygiene,
taking a particular focus on the hygiene of decommissioned storage devices. We
then explore some of the technical nuances of delete and erase operations using
modern day technologies.
4 https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/delete
5 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/delete
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/delete
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2.1 Personal Data Hygiene
A large number of publications dating back to 2005 provide both longitudinal
and intercultural insights into people’s data hygiene. Researchers typically buy
second-hand storage devices on the open market and forensically analyse them,
and report their findings. The first of these studies was conducted on second-
hand hard-disk drives (HDD) purchased in the UK back in 2005 [17] and was
repeated yearly until 2009 [7]. Similar studies have be conducted on second-
hand USB storage devices (e.g., [6]), and mobile phones (e.g., [16]). Studies
of this nature are also not limited to the UK market, with similar research
being carried out in other parts of the world (e.g., Australia [14] and USA [1]).
Consistent across these studies is the presence of sensitive personal data from
a large number of decommissioned drives due to failures in the erasure process.
Jones et al. [7], for example, forensically analysed USB sticks bought in the UK
and recovered personal data which included: birth certificates, videos of children
at a school, client data, and police staff records (names and date of birth).
In addition, memory chips from decommissioned devices are commonly re-
cycled into new electronics, even though some of their old content may still be
available and could be recovered [9,10]. The risk of data breaches from recy-
cled memory chips is likely to increase due to Directive 2012/19/EU on ‘waste
electrical and electronic equipment’. Article 4 aims at encouraging “cooperation
between producers and recyclers” to integrate more recycled material in new
equipment and Article 5 gives priority to achieving high recycle rates for small
IT devices such as USB sticks.
Diesburg et al. [1] compared people’s data hygiene practices with their inten-
tions when decommissioning USB sticks, and found people regularly confusing
delete and erase functions. The authors recovered data from 83.3% of USB sticks
where previous owners anticipated it being “very hard” to recover.
In summary, people often fail to appropriately erase sensitive data when
decommissioning USB sticks, and these devices can cause data breaches when
sold as second-hand devices or recycled into new electronics.
2.2 Delete and Erase Functions
When files are written to a storage device, the device must be running some
type of file system (e.g., FAT, NTFS). The job of a file systems is to keep a
record of the existence and location of all files and folders written to the storage
device. When a file is deleted, the record of the file is deleted, but the file’s
content remains and can usually be recovered. Over time, when additional files
are written to the device, the deleted files may become overwritten, at which
point they are no longer recoverable [4].
To improve the security around file deletion, DoD 5220 Block Erase requires
that a file is overwritten (erased) a minimum of three times and then verified.
An even higher level of security is obtained by erasing an entire storage device,
ideally using the device’s internal secure erase function. These functions can
either execute a slow secure wipe operation, or in more modern drives can quickly
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delete cryptographic keys that were used to encrypt each file on the device,
making the data permanently unintelligible [4].
3 Methodology
We investigate and compare the UI for removing files in both macOS 10.14 and
Windows 10. We focus on these two OS as they account for more than 97% of the
desktop/laptop OS market share [12]. We perform an exploratory data collection
using a streamlined Cognitive Walkthrough (CW) method to gain insights into
how users may perceive the functionality of file removal operations in macOS
10.14 and Windows 10.
CW is a commonly used method for evaluating how well a system supports
users towards achieving their goals. It places a particular focus on the users cog-
nitive activities, e.g. their goals and knowledge [8]. This method is characterised
by having an evaluator work through a series of tasks from the user’s perspec-
tive, and to evaluate the systems ability to provide users with cues and prompts
to guide them towards task completion.
We oriented ourselves on the process described by Rieman et al. [13] and
Spencer [15] to prepare our CW. The context is defined by the UI’s of macOS
10.14 and Windows 10. The user has basic familiarity with both systems and
understands that the terms ‘erase’ and ‘delete’ denote similar concepts. The two
goals were to (1) erase a single file on a USB memory stick and (2) erase all files
on a USB memory stick. The necessary sequence of actions consist of locating
the target for erasure, the appropriate UI elements to erase the file, and lastly
erasing the file.
We installed both OS on separate devices and ensured that they were fully
patched. We followed the streamlined CW approach by Spencer [15], conducting
a step-by-step analysis of how the UI could guide the user attempting to execute
the necessary sequence of correct actions. At each step of this process, we assess
the visual cues available for the next action and the feedback given to the user
after each action.
3.1 Forensic analysis
Prior to each CW we restored the test USB stick back to its “factory state”
and analysed it with FTK Imager Lite 3.4.3.36 to confirm that no residual data
was residing on the device. We then created a text file containing lorem ipsum
placeholder text, and saved this file inside a folder on the USB stick. At the end
of each CW, we forensically analysed the USB stick with FTK Imager Lite to
determine whether the CW had resulted in a delete or erase operation.
The CW were conducted by the first author and evidenced with screenshots
and note taking. The second author sighted the screenshots and notes and ver-
ified that they fulfilled the necessary sequence of actions, and were consistent
with a typical user being guided by UI cues and prompts.
6 https://forensicswiki.org/wiki/FTK Imager
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4 Results
In this section we report on the results from our CW following the process
described in section 3. Although we maintained a detailed record of step-by-step
user actions during each CW, we limit our reporting to UI screens presented to
users that are relevant to either delete or erase functions. We present findings
from a total of nine goal-oriented CW using two different OS. We then report
the results from our forensic analyses which determine the effectiveness of these
functions. In doing so, we can identify any inconsistencies between the UI’s
reported functionality and the underlying technical operation.
4.1 macOS 10.14
Goal: Erase a single file. To remove a file from a USB stick, the user can
locate the USB stick in the Finder application and move the file to Trash. As the
file is still visible in the Trash, the user can attempt to further remove it using
either of two methods. (1) The user can right mouse button click on the file to
open the context menu, and select “Delete Immediately...”. This opens a new
dialogue window, which will inform the user that this action will immediately
delete the file (see fig. 1a) and cannot be undone. The CW concludes when the
user confirms the operation by selecting the “Delete” button. (2) The user can
right mouse button click on the Trash symbol in the Dock to open the context
menu, and select “Empty Trash”. This opens a new dialogue window, which
informs the user that this action will permanently erase all files in the Trash
and cannot be undone (see fig. 1b). The CW concludes when the user confirms
the operation by selecting the “Empty Trash” button. Under both conditions
our forensic analysis was able to recover the test file.
(a) Dialogue when deleting a single
file from the Trash.
(b) Dialogue when deleting all files
from the Trash.
Fig. 1: macOS 10.14 dialogues when deleting the test file from the Trash.
Goal: Erase all files on a USB stick. To remove all files on the USB stick,
the user has two options. (1) They can remove all files similar to the removal of
a single file (see above). Using this method entails that the files are deleted and
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likely to be recoverable under a forensic examination. Alternatively, (2) the user
can launch the Disk Utility application, and select the “Erase” option on the top
feature bar. This opens a new dialogue window, which informs the user that this
action will delete all data stored on the USB stick and cannot be undone. (see
fig. 2). The CW concludes when the user confirms the operation by selecting the
“Erase” button. Our subsequent forensic analysis was able to recover the test
file.
Fig. 2: macOS 10.14 dialogue when erasing the USB stick with Disk Utility.
In a variation to the above procedure, the user can select the “Security Op-
tions” prior to selecting the “Erase” button. This opens a new dialogue window
(see fig. 3) where the user can select a range of security options. On the default
option, the dialogue window informs the user that this will not securely erase
the files and disk recovery applications may recover them. For the other three
options, the dialogue window informs the user that the function will erase the
data. The CW concludes when the user makes a selection and confirms the op-
eration when selecting the “OK” button followed by the “Erase” button (see
fig. 2). Our forensic analysis was able to recovery the test file when using the
default security option, but unable to recover the file when using any of the other
three secure erase options.
4.2 Windows 10
Goal: Erase a single file. To remove the test file from the USB stick, the
user can locate the USB stick in the Explorer application and physically press
the keyboard delete button whilst the file is selected. This opens a new dialogue
window7, which informs the user that this action will permanently delete the
file (see fig. 4). The CW concludes when the user confirms this operation by
7 Windows 10 treated our USB stick as ‘removable media’, which is why files were not
placed in the Recycle Bin first. This might differ under other circumstances but is
unlikely to affect the overall result of this CW.
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Fig. 3: macOS 10.14 dialogue to select Security Options when erasing the USB
stick with Disk Utility. The lower description changes as different options are
selected on the horizontal slider.
selecting the “Yes” button. Our subsequent forensic analysis was able to recover
the test file.
Fig. 4: Windows 10 dialogue when deleting the test file from the USB stick.
Goal: Erase all files on a USB stick. To remove all files on the USB stick,
the user has three options: they can (1) proceed similarly to the removal of a
single file8 (see above), (2) access the “Format” dialogue from the Explorer, or
(3) access the application “Disk Management”.
If the user chooses to access the Format dialogue in Explorer, a new dialogue
window opens (see fig. 5a), where the user can confirm the operation by selecting
“Start”. A second dialogue window informs the user that this will erase all
data (see fig. 6a). The CW concludes when the user confirms this operation
by selecting “OK ”. After performing this quick format operation, our forensic
analysis was able to recover the test file. In a variation to the above, the user
deselects “Quick Format” (which is selected by default) before selecting “Start”.
Our forensic analysis was unable to recover the test file after this operation.
8 This option would entail that the files are deleted and likely to be recoverable under
a forensic examination.
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If the user chooses to access the Disk Management application, they can
select “Format...” from the context menu of the USB stick. This opens a new
dialogue window (see fig. 5b), where the user can confirm the operation by
selecting the “OK ” button. A second dialogue window informs the user that
this will erase all data and suggests making a backup before formatting the USB
stick (see fig. 6b). The CW concludes when the user confirms the operation by
selecting “OK ”. After performing this quick format, our forensic analysis was
able to recover the test file. In a variation of the above, the user can deselect
“Perform a quick format” (which is selected by default) before selecting “OK ”.
Consistent with previous results our forensic analysis was unable to recover the
test file.
(a) Format dialogue accessed
via Explorer.
(b) Format dialogue accessed via Disk
Management.
Fig. 5: Windows 10 dialogues when erasing the USB stick.
Alternatively, within the Disk Management application, the user can select
“Delete Volume...” from the context menu of the USB stick. This opens a new
dialogue window, which informs the user that the action will erase all data and
suggests making a backup before deleting the USB stick (see fig. 6c). The CW
concludes when the user confirms the action by selecting the “OK ” button.
After performing this delete volume operation, our forensic analysis was able to
recover the test file.
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(a) Dialogue when selecting to start For-
matting a USB stick in fig. 5a (Ex-
plorer).
(b) Dialogue when confirming the For-
matting of a USB stick in fig. 5b (Disk
Management).
(c) Dialogue when confirming to Delete
Volume of USB stick. (Disk Manage-
ment)
Fig. 6: Windows 10 confirmation dialogues for formatting and deleting a volume.
4.3 Results of forensic analysis
Our CW identified three methods for removing a file from a test USB stick when
using macOS 10.14, and six methods when using Windows 10. However, after
completing a forensic examination of our test USB stick after performing each
method, the test file was fully recoverable after two of the file removal methods in
macOS, and after four of the file removal methods in Windows 10. (see table 1).
5 Discussion
Modern OS for computers commonly provide accessible data delete functionality
to users. Yet, data erasure functions for entire drives are typically located at
deeper levels of administrative tools, whilst functionality to erasure individual
files is not provided without expert knowledge or the use of third-party software.
Restricting these functions can protect users from accidental data loss. How-
ever, omitting information, guidance, and functionality can place lay users –
especially those in the role of data controller – at risk of causing accidental
data breaches. This could result in data subjects having their data exposed, and
organisations being non-compliant with data protection legislation.
In the following section we discuss the results from our investigation of delete
and erase functions in macOS and Windows, and suggest alternative UI design
approaches. We focus on default options and the terminology used to label and
describe these functions in the UI; and then discuss the relevance of sufficient
guidance for users. Entwined into these discussions, we argue for OS-dependent
changes to the UI and highlight OS-independent implications of our findings.
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Table 1: Summary of our forensic analysis for various methods to remove data
from USB sticks. Data removed with a delete function was successfully recovered,
data removed with an erase function was not recoverable.
System Function
Forensic evaluation
Deletion Erasure
m
a
cO
S
1
0
.1
4 Goal Erase single file
ä Finder X
Goal Erase all files
ä Disk Utility (default options) X
ä Disk Utility (changed options) X
W
in
d
ow
s
1
0 Goal Erase single file
ä Explorer X
Goal Erase all files
ä Explorer Format (default options) X
ä Explorer Format (changed options) X
ä Disk Management Delete Volume X
ä Disk Management Format (default options) X
ä Disk Management Format (changed options) X
5.1 Default options
macOS 10.14 and Windows 10 provide functionality to securely erase all data
from a USB stick. Yet, both OS use default options that reduce the effectiveness
of these functions. We suspect that these default options are designed to increase
the speed in which these operations are executed, with delete operations being
much faster then erase operations to execute. Under macOS 10.14, the Disk
Utility application contains security options (see fig. 3) to “specify how to erase
the selected disk”. Its default option contains a description that the files may
be recoverable using certain data recovery applications. Figure 5 shows two UI
screens for formatting a drive in Windows 10, with options “Quick Format” and
“Perform a quick format” preselected. These options do not provide the user
with any form of description. In both OS we were able to recover the test file
when these default options were set.
Defaulting an option is commonly understood by users as a recommenda-
tion, reducing the likelihood of other options being selected by the user [11].
In the context of this research, default options discourage users from securely
erasing files. Yet, those users might have significant interests in a secure era-
sure. We recommend an active selection process which encourages users to make
an informed decision. In Windows 10, for example, the single confirmation but-
ton in fig. 5 could be replaced with two confirmation buttons to actively select
between “Quick Format” and “Full Format”.
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5.2 Incorrect terminology
Inconsistent and incorrect terminology was used for delete and erase functions
across both OS. For example deleting a file (or multiple files) from the Trash in
macOS is labelled as both delete and erase, depending on whether a single file
or all files are deleted (see fig. 1). However, our forensic analysis found that both
of these functions perform a delete operation, as in both cases the test file was
fully recoverable.
Incorrect use of the terms delete and erase in OS UI might reinforce colloquial
use and foster the misunderstanding that they denote the same technical func-
tion. This interferes with users’ ability to make informed decisions. We argue the
terms erase and delete should be used exclusively in relation to their technical
meaning. In some cases the outcome of an operation (i.e. whether the OS will
execute an erase or delete function) depends on future input from the user, e.g.
in fig. 2 the outcome of pressing the Erase button depends on possible changes to
the default security option. Under such circumstances we recommend labelling
the confirmation button with a neutral term, e.g. ‘Proceed’, and customising the
description text depending on the selected security options.
5.3 Insufficient guidance and cues
During our CW we encountered multiple dialogue screens with insufficient or
inadequate descriptions of underlying technical operation. For instance, the de-
scriptive text in fig. 1 provides macOS users with a warning that they “can’t
undo this action”. Whilst it may not be possible for users to undo this action
using native functions within the OS, forensic software is able to fully recover
these files. This can therefore create a false sense of security that these files are
no longer recoverable. In Windows 10, when a file is deleted from the system,
the final description of the function (see fig. 4) informs users that the file will be
“permanently deleted” but lacks detail on what ‘permanent’ means and whether
the file could, under certain conditions, still be recovered.
Informative and accessible descriptions are required for informed decision
making. Information related to a user task should not be exclusively accessible
through optional UI screens. On each screen, where a user can make a selection,
the relevant consequences of this decision should be explained. We suggest adding
informative text to describe the difference between delete and erase functions
where it is contextually relevant within an OS UI. Furthermore, a note about
the existence of file recovery applications should be added to all delete function
confirmation screens.
5.4 OS-independent implications
Designers of UIs rely on metaphors to make complex and abstract functions more
intuitive and comprehensible for users [2]. For instance, placing an unwanted file
into the recycle bin uses multiple metaphors from an office environment, allow-
ing users to relate these complex computing artifacts and processes to everyday
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physical items and actions. Yet, the ‘delete’ and ‘erase’ metaphors are problem-
atic, as they denote different meaning in the UI, whilst relating back to the same
constructs in the physical world. Designers should therefore consider integrating
new metaphors that better distinguish between these two functions to reduce
the risk of confusion for users.
As well as being well positioned to provide users with guidance on the appro-
priate use of delete and erase functions, OS can also provide appropriate cues
and prompts towards more secure outcomes. In section 2.1 we discussed past
research showing how people intend to erase data from decommissioned drives
but fail to do so securely, with researchers being able to recover data using dig-
ital forensic techniques. We propose OS should detect when a user deletes all
(visible) files from a memory storage device, e.g. USB stick. Upon detection of
this event, the OS could remind the user about the difference between delete and
erase functions, nudging the user to take an informed decision before potentially
decommissioning said device.
Lastly, we suggest official guidelines and best practice be developed on GDPR
compliant erasure of data. This would be informative to users and provide OS a
single source for developing consistent UI functionality across platforms. The Eu-
ropean Data Protection Board9 may be best positioned to develop these as they
are already tasked with issuing guidelines, recommendations, and best practice
on other GDPR-related topics (Article 70 GDPR), and consist of representa-
tives from each national data protection authority (including EEA countries).
In addition, national data protection authorities could make recommendations
to carry out a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) for the process of de-
commissioning data storage devices, since this activity can be “likely to result in
a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (Article 35 GDPR).
6 Limitations
Cognitive walkthroughs are limited in that they do not involve (non-expert)
users, the results are solely based on skills and expertise of the evaluators, and
the frequency of identified problems cannot be estimated. This means that cog-
nitive walkthroughs commonly only identify a subset of usability issues of the
evaluation system. However, we do not believe this limitation reduced the va-
lidity of the issues identified in our analysis. The file system of the USB stick
used in our study was set to FAT32 as it is the most commonly used file system
for this type of device. We do not anticipate different file systems would have
affected our findings but further work would be needed to confirm this.
7 Conclusion
We investigated possible causes for confusion around delete and erase functions,
which was identified as a privacy and security threat in context of decommis-
sioned USB sticks. In two of the most commonly used OS in today’s market, we
9 See https://edpb.europa.eu.
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identified inconsistencies in the UI, insecure default options, and confusing and
occasionally incorrect guidance. Finally, we propose design changes that could
alleviate these issues and motivate a “call for action” for official guidelines and
best practice on GDPR compliant erasure to be developed.
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